When voter preferences are known in an incomplete (partial) manner, winner determination is commonly treated as the identification of the necessary and possible winners; these are the candidates who win in all completions or at least one completion, respectively, of the partial voting profile. In the case of a positional scoring rule, the winners are the candidates who receive the maximal total score from the voters. Yet, the outcome of an election might go beyond the absolute winners to the top-k winners, as in the case of committee selection, primaries of political parties, and ranking in recruiting. We investigate the computational complexity of determining the necessary and possible top-k winners over partial voting profiles. Our results apply to general classes of positional scoring rules and focus on the cases where k is given as part of the input and where k is fixed.
Introduction
A central task in social choice is that of winner determination-how to aggregate the candidate preferences of voters to select the winner. Relevant scenarios may be political elections, document rankings in search engines, hiring dynamics in the job market, decision making in multiagent systems, determination of outcomes in sports tournaments, and so on [Brandt et al., 2016] . Different voting rules can be adopted for this task. The computational social-choice community has studied in depth the family of the positional scoring rules, where each voter assigns to each candidate a score based on the candidate's position in the voter's ranking, and then a winner is a candidate who receives the maximal sum of scores. Famous instantiations of the positional scoring rules include the plurality rule (where a winner is most frequently ranked first), the veto rule (where a winner is least frequently ranked last), their generalizations to t-approval and t-veto, respectively, and the Borda rule (where the score is the actual position in the reverse order).
The seminal work of Konczak and Lang [2005] has addressed the situation where voter preferences are expressed or known in just a partial manner. The framework is based on the notions of the necessary winners and possible winners, who are the candidates that win in every completion, or at least one completion, respectively, of the given partial preferences into complete ones. More precisely, a voting profile consists of a partial order for each voter, and a completion consists of a linear extension for each of the partial orders. Determining the necessary and possible winners is computationally challenging since, conceptually, it involves reasoning about the entire (exponential-size) space of such completions. The complexity of these problems has been thoroughly studied in a series of publications that established a full classification of a general class of positional scoring rules (the "pure" scoring rules) into tractable and intractable ones [Betzler and Dorn, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2011; Baumeister and Rothe, 2012] .
The outcome of an election often goes beyond the single winner to the set of top-k winners. For example, the top-k winners might be the elected parliament members, the entries of the first page of the search engine, the job candidates to recruit, and the finalists of a sports competition. In the case of a positional scoring rule, the top-k winners are the candidates who receive the top scores (under some tie-breaking mechanism) [Meir et al., 2008] . Adopting the framework of Konczak and Lang [2005] , in this paper we investigate the computational complexity of determining the necessary and possible top-k winners for incomplete voting profiles and positional scoring rules.
We show that the top-k variant makes the problems fundamentally harder than their top-1 counterparts (necessary and possible winners) when k is given as input. For example, it is known that detecting the possible winners is NP-hard for every pure rule, with the exception of plurality and veto where the problem is solvable in polynomial time [Betzler and Dorn, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2011; Baumeister and Rothe, 2012] ; we show that in the case of top-k, the problem is NP-hard for every pure rule, including plurality and veto. Moreover, tractability of the necessary winners does not extend to the necessary top-k winners: we show that the detecting whether a candidate is necessarily a top-k winner is coNP-complete for a quite general class of positional scoring rules that include all of the aforementioned ones. We also study the impact of fixing k and establish a more positive picture: detecting the necessary top-k winners is tractable (assuming that the scores are polynomial in the number of candidates) and detecting the possible the top-k winners is tractable for plurality and veto.
The concept of the top-k winners can be viewed as a special case of multiwinner election that has been studied mostly in the context of committee selection. Various utilities have been studied for qualifying selected committee, such as maximizing the number of voters with approved candidates [Aziz et al., 2015] and, in that spirit, the Condorcet committees [Elkind et al., 2011; Darmann, 2013] , aiming at proportional representation via frameworks such as Chamberlin and Courant's [1983] and Monroe's [1995] , and the satisfaction of fairness and diversity constraints [Celis et al., 2018; Bredereck et al., 2018] .
In the case of incomplete voter preferences, the generalization of the problem we study is that of detecting the necessary and possible committee members. These are interesting and challenging problems in all the variants of committee selection, and we leave them for future investigation. Note, however, that the problem of determining the elected committee can be intractable even if the preferences are complete [Procaccia et al., 2007; Procaccia et al., 2008; Darmann, 2013; Skowron et al., 2015] , in contrast to the topk winners. Yet, we show that our results imply the tractability of determining whether a candidate set is a necessary or possible Condorcet committee in the case of the plurality and veto rules. The problem of multiwinner determination for incomplete votes has been studied by Lu and Boutilier [2013] in a perspective different from the necessary and possible top-k winners: find a committee that minimizes the maximum objection (or "regret") over all possible completions.
Preliminaries
We begin with some notation and terminology. Voting Profiles and Positional Scoring Rules. Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } be the set of candidates (or alternatives) and let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } be the set of voters. A voting profile T = (T 1 , . . . , T n ) consists of n linear orders on C, where each T i represents the ranking of C by v i .
A positional scoring rule r is a series { s m } m∈N + of m-dimensional vectors s m = ( s m (1), . . . , s m (m)) where s m (1) ≥ · · · ≥ s m (m) and s m (1) > s m (m). We denote s m (j) by r (m, j) . Some examples of positional scoring rules include the plurality rule (1, 0, . . . , 0), the t-approval rule (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) that begins with t ones, the veto rule (1, . . . , 1, 0), the t-veto rule that ends with t zeros, and the Borda rule (m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0).
Given a voting profile T = (T 1 , . . . , T n ), the score s(T i , c, r) that the voter v i contributes to the candidate c is r(m, j) where j is the position of c in T i . The score of c in T is s(T, c, r) = n i=1 s(T i , c, r) or simply s(T, c) if r is clear from context. The winners (or co-winners) are the candidates c with a maximal s(T, c).
We make standard assumptions about the positional scoring rule r. We assume that r(m, i) is computable in polynomial time in m. We also assume that the numbers in each s m are co-prime (i.e., their greatest common divisor is one).
A positional scoring rule is pure if s m+1 is obtained from s m by inserting a score at some position, for all m > 1.
Partial Profiles. A partial voting profile P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) consists of n partial orders on set C of candidates, where each P i represents the incomplete preference of the voter v i . A completion of P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) is a complete voting profile T = (T 1 , . . . , T n ) where each T i is a completion (i.e., linear extension) of the partial order P i .
The problems of necessary winners and possible winners were introduced by Konczak and Lang [2005] . Given a partial voting profile P, a candidate c ∈ C is a necessary winner if c is a winner in every completion T of P, and c is a possible winner if there exists a completion T of P where c is a winner. The decision problems associated to a positional scoring rule r are those of determining, given a partial profile P and a candidate c, whether c is a necessary winner and whether c is a possible winner. We denote these problems by NW and PW, respectively. A classification of the complexity of these problems has been established in a sequence of publications. Theorem 1 (Classification Theorem [Betzler and Dorn, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2011; Baumeister and Rothe, 2012] ). NW can be solved in polynomial time for every positional scoring rule. PW is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto; for all other pure scoring rules, it is NP-complete.
In this paper, we aim towards generalizing the Classification Theorem to determine the necessary and possible top-k winners, as we formalize next. Top-k Winners. In principle, a top-k winner is a candidate that is ranked at one of the top k places with respect to the sum of scores from the voters. However, for a precise definition, we need to reason about ties. One could adopt several options for being on the top-k winners: (a) w.r.t. at least one tie-breaking order; (b) w.r.t. every tie-breaking order; and (c) w.r.t. a tie-breaking order given as input. For simplicity of presentation, we adopt the third variation and assume that the tie-breaking order is given as input. Nevertheless, all of our results hold for all three variations.
Formally, let r be a positional scoring rule, C be a set of candidates, T a voting profile, and ≻ tie a tie breaker, which is simply a linear order over C. Let R T be the linear order on C that sorts the candidates lexicographically by their scores and then by ≻ tie ; that is,
A candidate c is a top-k winner if the position of c in R T , denoted by rank(T, c), is at most k. Note that a top-1 winner is necessarily a winner, but a winner might not be a top-1 winner due to tie breaking. If T is replaced with a partial voting profile P, then a candidate c is a necessary top-k winner if c is a top-k winner in every completion T of P, and a possible top-k winner if c is a top-k winner in at least one completion T of P. Hence, for a positional scoring rule r, we have two computational problems where the input consists of a candidate set C, a partial profile P, a tie breaker ≻ tie , a candidate c and a number k:
• In NTW, the goal is to determine whether c is a necessary top-k winner. • In PTW, the goal is to determine whether c is a possible top-k winner.
We will also consider the versions where k is fixed, and then denote it by parameterizing the problem with k: NTW k and PTW k Additional Notation. We use the following notation. For a set A and a partition A 1 , . . . , A t of A:
• P (A 1 , . . . , A t ) denotes the partitioned partial order P (A 1 , . . . , A t ) := {a 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a t : ∀i ∈ [t], a i ∈ A i }.
• O(A 1 , . . . , A t ) denotes an arbitrary linear order on A that completes P (A 1 , . . . , A t ).
A linear order a 1 ≻ · · · ≻ a t is also denoted as a vector (a 1 , . . . , a t ). The concatenation (a 1 , . . . , a t )
Hardness of Top-k Winners
We first show that the problems we study are computationally hard for quite general classes of positional scoring rules.
Plurality and Veto
The following theorems state the hardness for the plurality and veto rules where both NW and PW are solvable in polynomial time (according to the Classification Theorem).
Theorem 2. For the plurality rule, NTW is coNP-complete and PTW is NP-complete.
Proof. Memberships in the corresponding classes (coNP and NP) are straightforward, so we prove only hardness. We show a reduction for each of the two problems.
NTW:
We show a reduction from exact cover by-3sets (X3C), which is the following decision problem: Given a vertex set U = {u 1 , . . . , u 3q } and a collection E of 3-element subsets of U , can we cover all the elements of U using q pairwise-disjoint sets from E? For u ∈ U , denote by E(u) the set {e ∈ E : u ∈ e} of edges incident to u. Given U and E, we construct an instance (C, P, ≻ tie ) of NTW under the plurality rule where C = E ∪ {c * }, where ≻ tie = O(E, {c * }), and where P is the partial voting profile (P 1 , . . . , P 3q , T 3q+1 , T 3q+2 , T 3q+3 ). For every i ∈ [3q],
This means that the ith voter can vote only for edges that cover u i . For i > 3q the order is T i = O({c * } , E). To complete, we show that there is an exact cover if and only if c * is not a necessary top-q winner.
Suppose that c * is not a necessary top-q winner, that is, there are q candidates e i1 , . . . , e iq and a completion T of P such that s(T, e ij ) ≥ s(T, c * ) = 3 for all j ∈ [q]. Since every edge can get at most three votes, we get that s(T, e ij ) = 3 for every j ∈ [q]. Therefore e i1 , . . . , e iq is an exact cover: every vertex u i is covered by the edge that P i voted for, and the edges are pairwise disjoint (since, if two edges are overlapping, then one gets at most two votes).
Conversely, given an X3C solution Q = e i1 , . . . , e iq define a profile T = (T 1 , . . . , T 3q+3 ) such that for every i ∈ [3q] we have
Every T i extends P i , for all e ∈ Q we have s(T, e) = 3, and s(T, c * ) = 3. Hence, all edges in Q defeat c * , and c * is a not a top-q winner in T.
PTW:
We use a reduction from the dominating set problem, which is the following: Given an undirected graph G = (U, E) and an integer k, is there a set D ⊆ U of size k such that every vertex is either in D or adjacent to some vertex in D? Given a graph (U,
Hence, the ith voter can vote only for vertices that dominate u i . To complete, we show that the graph has a dominating set of size k if and only if c * is a possible top-k winner.
Suppose there is a dominating set D of size k, consider the profile T = (T 1 , . . . , T n ) where for every i ∈ [n],
In this completion, for each u / ∈ D we get s(T, u) = 0. These are n − k candidates that c * defeats, therefore c * is a possible top-k winner. Conversely, if c * is a possible top-k winner then in some completion T it defeats at least n − k candidates, and these candidates have a score 0 in T. Let D be the set of candidates that c * does not defeat in T, all voters voted for candidates in D and |D| ≤ k. A voter P i can only vote for vertices which dominate u i , hence D is a dominating set of size at most k.
Next, we show the hardness of NTW and PTW beyond the plurality rule. Given a binary positional scoring rule r, we define the complementary-reversed scoring rule, denoted r R , to be the one given by r R (m, i) = 1 − r(m, m + 1 − i). For example, the complementary-reversed rule of plurality is veto, and more generally, the complementary-reversed rule of t-approval is t-veto.
Lemma 1. For every binary positional scoring rule r, there is a reduction 1. from NTW for r to the complement of PTW for r R ; 2. from PTW for r to the complement of NTW for r R .
Proof. For a partial order P i , the reversed order is defined by
Since the tie-breaking order is also reversed, it holds that rank(T ′ , c) = m + 1 − rank(T, c) for every c ∈ C. In same way, if T ′ is a completion of P ′ then by reversing the orders we get a completion T of P such that rank(T, c) = m + 1 − rank(T ′ , c) for every c ∈ C. We can deduce that for any candidate c and integer k, 1. c is not a necessary top-k winner w.r.t (C, P, ≻ tie ) and r (there exists a completion T of P such that
From the above two points we conclude the two parts of the lemma, respectively.
Combining Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we conclude that: Theorem 3. For the veto rule, NTW is coNP-complete and PTW is NP-complete.
Beyond Plurality and Veto
What about positional scoring rules other than plurality and veto? For any other pure positional scoring rule, PW is NPcomplete by the Classification Theorem, so PTW is also NPcomplete (by choosing k = 1). Combining this observation with Theorems 2 and 3, we conclude that:
Corollary 1. PTW is NP-complete for every pure positional scoring rule.
While we do not have a full classification for NTW, we show the hardness of NTW under general conditions that include the commonly studied rules. First, we can deduce hardness for every pure positional scoring rule with binary scores. We already established hardness for plurality and veto in Theorems 2 and 3. For any other rule r in this class, PW is NPcomplete for r R (by the Classification Theorem), so a small change in the proof of Lemma 1 shows that NTW is coNPcomplete for r. We conclude that:
Corollary 2. NTW is coNP-complete for every pure positional scoring rules with binary scores.
To discuss rules with scores beyond binary, we define the class of polynomially frequent scoring rules where some score occurs frequently in the scoring vector. All commonly studied rules fall under this definition, except for Borda. Examples of polynomially frequent rules include tapproval (where x = 0) and t-veto (where x = 1). Another rule is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) that has been studied in depth [Baumeister et al., 2011] . This class strictly generalizes that of the almost constant scoring rules that has also been studied in the context of the complexity of winner determination [Kimelfeld et al., 2018; Kenig and Kimelfeld, 2019] .
We will prove that NTW is hard for all pure polynomially frequent scoring rules. For that, we need a definition and a lemma. Let r and r ′ be two positional scoring rules. We say that r ′ polynomially contains r if there exist a polynomial p(m), an index i m ≤ p(m) − m and two numbers a m > 0 and b m such that r(m, j) = a m · r ′ (p(m), i m + j) + b m for all m, j ∈ [m]. For instance, t-approval polynomially contains plurality for every fixed t, by choosing p(m) = m + t − 1, i m = t − 1, a m = 1 and b m = 0. Similarly, t-veto polynomially contains veto. Lemma 2. Let r and r ′ be two positional scoring rules. If r ′ polynomially contains r, then there is a reduction 1. from NTW for r to NTW for r ′ ; 2. from PTW for r to PTW for r ′ .
Proof. Let p(m), i m , a m , and b m be the functions that realize the polynomial containment. Given (C, P, ≻ tie ) as input under r with P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ), consider the input
where, in each P ′ j , the i m highestranked candidates are the ones of D 1 , the p(m)−i m −m lowest-ranked candidates are the ones of D 2 , and between D 1 and D 2 the candidates of C are the same as in P j . In our notation, P ′ j := P j ∪ P (D 1 , C, D 2 ). • In ≻ ′ tie , the i m highest-ranked candidates are the ones of D 1 , the p(m) − i m − m lowest-ranked candidates are the ones of D 2 , and between D 1 and D 2 the candidates of C are the same as in ≻ tie . In our notation,
Since r ′ polynomially contains in r, for every c ∈ C we get that Hence, by the definition of ≻ ′ tie , the positions of the candidates satisfy rank(T ′ , c) = rank(T, c) + i m . Conversely, let T ′ be a completion of P ′ . Every T ′ j has to be of the form O(D 1 ) • O(C) • O(D 2 ), so removing D 1 and D 2 from all the linear orders gives a completion T of P such that rank(T, c) = rank(T ′ , c) − i m for all c ∈ C. We conclude that for all c ∈ C and k it holds that c is a necessary (resp., possible) top-k winner w.r.t. (C, P, ≻ tie ) and r if and only if c is a necessary (resp., possible) top-(k + i m ) winner w.r.t. (C ′ , P ′ , ≻ ′ tie ) and r ′ . Note that Lemma 2 can be applied for non-pure rules, so the second item can be used for rules not covered by Corollary 1. Consequently, we get the following general hardness. Theorem 4. NTW is coNP-complete for every pure polynomially frequent scoring rule.
Proof. Let r be a pure polynomially frequent scoring rule, and denote r by { s m } m>1 . Let m ′ be the minimal m where x occurs in s m , and let j be the index of x in s m ′ . First, consider the case where j > 1, which means that s m ′ contains both x and a score greater than x. Since the rule is pure we can deduce that for every m ≥ m ′ , s m also contains both x and a score greater than x. Then, there exists some score y m > x such that s O(m 1/ε ) contains the vector (y m , x, . . . , x) of length m + 1. Choosing p(m) = O(m 1/ε ), i m as the biggest index of y m , a m = y m − x and b m = x shows that, in this case, r polynomially contains plurality. The hardness results then follow from Theorem 2 and Lemma 2. Now consider the case where j = 1, hence for every m ≥ m ′ , s m contains both x and a score smaller than x (since the rule is pure). Then, there exist some score y m < x such that s O(m 1/ε ) contains the vector (x, . . . , x, y m ) of length m + 1. Choosing p(m) = O(m 1/ε ), i m as the smallest index of x, a m = x − y m , b m = y m shows that in this case r polynomially contains veto. Hardness for r then follows from Theorem 3 and Lemma 2.
To complete the picture, we are still missing the complexity of the top-k winners for the (pure) positional scoring rules that are not polynomially frequent. An example that stands out is the Borda rule. This is left as an open direction for future investigation that we have found quite challenging. For the special case of Borda, we can prove the hardness of NTW. Theorem 5. NTW is coNP-complete for the Borda rule.
The proof, discussed next, is nontrivial and heavily relies on the specific structure of this rule.
Proof of Theorem 5
We use the technique of circular voting blocks of Baumeister, Roos and Jörg [2011] . For a set A = {a 1 , . . . , a t } and i ∈ [t], the ith circular vote is M i (A) := (a i , a i+1 , . . . , a t , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i−1 ) .
We reduce from X3C as defined in the proof of Theorem 2. Given an X3C instance (U, E) with U = {u 1 , . . . , u 3q } and E = {e 1 , . . . , e m }, we construct an input (C, P, ≻ tie ) for NTW under Borda. The candidates are C = E ∪ D ∪ {c * } where D = {d 1 , . . . , d m−1 } and ≻ tie = O(E, {c * } , D). The voting profile is the concatenation (union) P = P 1 • T 2 • T 3 of the three parts described next.
First, P 1 = (P 1 1 , . . . , P 1 3q ). For every i ∈ [3q], only edges that cover u i can receive a score of 2m − 1. Edges that do not cover u i can receive at most m − 1, and c * receives 0. Formally, denote by deg(u i ) = |E(u i )| the degree of u i in the graph and let D ≤j = {d 1 , . . . , d j } and D >j = {d j+1 , . . . , d m−1 }. We assume that 1 ≤ deg(u i ) ≤ m − 1, otherwise the problem is trivial. The partial order is P
Note that for every e ∈ E \ E(u i ), the number of candidates ranked above e in P i is |E(u i )|+m−deg(u i ) = m, so indeed it receives a score of at most m − 1.
Second, T 2 is composed of S cvr := 3(2m − 1) + 3 q−1 i=1 (m − i) copies of the profile (T 2 1 , . . . , T 2 m ). For every i ∈ [m] the order T 2 i is constructed in the following way. Start with M i (E), then insert D and c * such that the score of c * is m and scores of e i , . . . , e m , e 1 , . . . , e i−1 are 2m − 1, 2m − 3, . . . , 5, 3, 0 accordingly if m is even. If m is odd then the scores of the edges are the same as before but with m − 1 instead of m and 1 instead of 0. Note that in both cases, the sum of the scores of the edges is the same.
Finally, T 3 consists of 4(3q + S cvr ) copies of the profile (T 3 1 , . . . , T 3 m+1 ). For this part only, denote e m+1 = c * . For every i ∈ [m + 1], T 3 i = M i ({e 1 , . . . , e m+1 }) • O(D). We state some observations regarding the profile. In T 2 , the score of c * is s(T 2 , c * ) = S cvr · s((T 2 1 , . . . , T 2 m ), c * ) = S cvr · m 2 For every e ∈ E, the score in T 2 is
In T 3 , for every d ∈ D, the score is
by the definition of the Borda rule). Combining these two inequalities with what we showed for T 3 , we can deduce that s(T, c) − s(T, d) > 0, which means that the candidates in C \ D always defeat all candidates in D. Claim 1. If there is an X3C, then c * is not a necessary top-q winner.
Proof. Assume, w.l.o.g., that the exact cover is Q = {e 1 , . . . , e q } and every edge in the cover is e i = {i, q + i, 2q + i}. Define a completion T = T 1 • T 2 • T 3 , T 1 = (T 1 1 , . . . , T 1 n ). In T 1 , every edge in the cover e i ∈ Q receives the following scores:
• e i gets 2m − 1 from T 1 i , T 1 q+i , T 1 2q+i , that is, e i is placed at the top in the vertices which it covers.
• e i gets m − 1 from the vertices of e i+1 , gets m − 2 from the vertices of e i+2 and so on (when we reach e q we go to e 1 and continue until e i−1 ). Note that in this way there is no vertex that should give the same score to two different edges, and since q ≤ m the range of scores e i gets is {m − 1, m − 2, . . . , m − q + 1} ⊆ {m − 1, . . . , 1} as required by the definition of P 1 . For every edge e ∈ Q, the total score in T 1 is s(T 1 , e) = 3(2m − 1) + 3 All candidates in Q defeat c * , hence c * is not a necessary top-q winner.
Claim 2. If c * is not a necessary top-q-winner, then there is an X3C.
Proof. Let T = T 1 • T 2 • T 3 be a completion where at least q candidates defeat c * , let Q be the q highest rated candidates in T . The candidate c * always defeats all candidates in D, hence Q ⊆ E. We show a lower bound and an upper bound on the total score of Q in T 1 .
Lower bound. As we already showed, every e ∈ Q should get s(T 1 , e) ≥ S cvr in order to defeat c * , therefore
Upper bound. For every u ∈ U denote by deg Q (u) the degree of u in the sub-graph induced by Q, then
Overall, the two bounds imply that 3q i=1 deg Q (u i ) 2 ≤ 3q and this is possible only if all the degrees are one: When all degrees are one, the sum is exactly 3q. If we decrease deg Q (u i ) to zero and increase deg Q (u j ) to two, then the total sum increases by three. Any further changes cannot decrease the total sum. Therefore, all degrees in the sub-graphs induced by Q are one, and Q is an X3C.
Top-k Sets
We have shown hardness results for the necessary and possible top-k winners. Interestingly, we can retain the tractable cases of the necessary-winner and possible-winner problems for the variant of the problem where we are given a set C ′ ⊆ C of k candidates, and the goal is to determine whether C ′ constitutes the exact set of top-k winners. We say that C ′ is a necessary top-k set if C ′ is the set of top-k winners in every completion, and a possible top-k set if C ′ is the set of top-k winners in at least one completion.
Theorem 6. Let r be a positional scoring rule. We can determine in time k · poly(n, m):
1. whether a given candidate set is a necessary top-k set; 2. whether a given candidate set is a possible top-k set, assuming that r is either plurality or veto.
Proof. For the first part of Theorem 6 (necessity), we only need to determine whether a candidate outside of C ′ can defeat a candidate from C ′ . This can be done using the algorithm of Xia and Conitzer [2011] , with a minor adjustment to account for tie breaking.
For the second part (possibility), for every candidate c ′ ∈ C ′ and every integer score 0 ≤ s ≤ n we use Lemma 5 (that we prove in the following section) to check if there exists a completion T which satisfies the following conditions. First, s(T, c ′ ) = s. Second, for every c ∈ C ′ \ {c ′ }, if c ≻ tie c ′ then s(T, c) ≥ s, otherwise s(T, c) > s. This means that all candidates in C ′ \ {c ′ } defeat c ′ . Finally, For every c ∈ C \ C ′ , if c ′ ≻ tie c then s(T, c) ≤ s, otherwise s(T, c) < s. This means that c ′ defeats all candidates in C \ C ′ . C ′ is a possible top-k set if and only if such completion exists for some candidate c ′ ∈ C ′ and score s.
Interestingly, for the plurality and veto rules, a set C ′ of candidates is a top-k set for at least one tie-breaking order if and only if C ′ is a Condorcet committee [Fishburn, 1981] . Then, by a simple adjustment of the proof of Theorem 6 we can conclude that, in the case of plurality and veto, one can determine in polynomial time whether a given candidate set is a necessary or possible Condorcet committee.
The Case of a Fixed k
In the previous section, we established that the problems of finding the necessary and possible top-k winners are very often intractable. In this section, we investigate the complexity of these problems under the assumption that k is fixed (and, in particular, can be the degree of the polynomial that bounds the running time). We will show that the complexity picture for NTW k and PTW k is way more positive, as we generalize the tractability of almost all of the tractable scoring rules for NW and PW. We will also generalize hardness results from PW to PTW k ; interestingly, this generalization turns out to be quite nontrivial.
Tractabiliy of NTW k
We first prove that NTW k is tractable for every positional scoring rule (pure or not), as long as the scores are bounded by a polynomial in the number m of candidates; in this case, we say that the rule has polynomial scores. Note that this assumption is in addition to our usual assumption that the scores can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. For all fixed k and positional scoring rules r with polynomial scores, NTW k is in polynomial time.
Note that all of the specific rules mentioned so far (i.e., tapproval, t-veto, Borda and so on) have polynomial scores, and hence, are covered by Theorem 7. An example of a rule that is not covered is the rule defined by r(m, j) = 2 m−j .
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 7. To determine whether a candidate c is a necessary top-k winner, we search for a counterexample, that is, k candidates that defeat c in some completion. For that, we iterate over every subset {c 1 , . . . , c k } ⊆ C \ {c} and determine whether these k + 1 candidates can get a combination of scores that constitues the counterexample.
More formally, let C be a set of candidates and r a positional scoring rule. For a partial profile P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) and a sequence S = (c 1 , . . . , c q ) of candidates from C, we denote by π(P, S) the set of all possible scores that the candidates in S can obtain jointly in a completion: π(P, S) := {(s(T, c 1 ), . . . , s(T, c q )) : T completes P} Note that π(P, S) ⊆ {0, . . . , n · s m (1)} q . When P consists of a single voter P , we write π(P, S) instead of π(P, S).
A counterexample for c being a necessary top-k winner is a sequence S = (c 1 , . . . , c q ) where q = k + 1 and c q = c, and a sequence (s 1 , . . . , s q ) ∈ π(P, S) such that each c i beats c when for i = 1, . . . , k the score of c i is s(c i ) = s i and s(c) = s q . The following two lemmas show that, indeed, we can find such a counterexample in polynomial time. Lemma 3. Let q be a fixed number and r a positional scoring rule. Whether (s 1 , . . . , s q ) ∈ π(P, S) can be determined in polynomial time, given a partial order P over a set of candidates, a sequence S of q candidates, and scores s 1 , . . . , s q .
Proof. We use a reduction to a scheduling problem where tasks have execution times, release times, deadlines, and precedence constraints (i.e., task x should be completed before starting task y). This scheduling problem can be solved in polynomial time [Garey et al., 1981] . In the reduction, each candidate c is a task with a unit execution time. For every c i in S, the release time is min {j ∈ [n] : r(m, j) = s i }, and the deadline is 1 + max {j ∈ [n] : r(m, j) = s i }. For the rest of the candidates, the release time is 1 and the deadline is m + 1. The precedence constraints are P . It holds that (s 1 , . . . , s q ) ∈ π(P, S) if and only if the tasks can be scheduled according to all the requirements.
From Lemma 3 we can conclude that when q is fixed and r has polynomial scores, we can construct π(P, S) in polynomial time, via straightforward dynamic programming. Lemma 4. Let q be a fixed natural number and r a positional scoring rule with polynomial scores. The set π(P, S) can be constructed in polynomial time, given a partial profile P and a sequence S of q candidates.
Proof. First, for every i ∈ [n], construct π(P i , S) using Lemma 3. Then, given π((P 1 , . . . , P i ), S), observe that π((P 1 , . . . , P i+1 ), S) = { u + w : u ∈ π((P 1 , . . . , P i ), S), w ∈ π(P i+1 , S)} where u + w is a point-wise sum of the two vectors ( u + w)(j) = u(j) + w(j). Hence, π(P, S) can be constructed via straightforward dynamic programming.
Complexity of PTW k

Plurality and Veto
We first show that the positional scoring rules that are tractable for PW, namely plurality and veto, are also tractable for PTW k . This is done by a reduction to the problem of polygamous matching [Kimelfeld et al., 2019] : Given a bipartite graph G = (U ∪ W, E) and natural numbers α w ≤ β w for all w ∈ W , determine whether there is a subset of E where each u ∈ U is incident to exactly one edge and every w ∈ W is incident to at least α w edges and at most β w edges. This problem is known to be solvable in polynomial time [Shiloach, 1981; Edmonds and Johnson, 2001] .
Lemma 5. The following decision problem can be solved in polynomial time for the plurality and veto rules: given a partial profile P over a set C of candidates and numbers γ c ≤ δ c for every candidate c, is there a completion T such that γ c ≤ s(T, c) ≤ δ c for every c ∈ C?
Proof. For both rules, we apply a reduction to polygamous matching, where U = V (the set of voters) and W = C. For plurality, E connects v i ∈ V and c ∈ C whenever c can be in the top position in one or more completions of P i , and the bounds are α c = γ c and β c = δ c . For veto, receiving a score s is equivalent to being placed in the bottom position of n − s voters, so E connects v i ∈ V and c ∈ C whenever c can be in the bottom position in one or more completions of P i . The bounds are α c = n − δ c and β c = n − γ c .
Finally, to solve PTW k given C, P, ≻ tie and c, we consider every set D ⊆ C \ {c} of size m − k and search for a completion where c defeats all candidates of D. For that, we iterate over every integer score 0 ≤ s ≤ n and use Lemma 5 to test whether there exists a completion T such that s(T, c) ≥ s, and for every d ∈ D we have s(T, d) ≤ s if c ≻ tie d or s(T, d) < s otherwise. Hence, we conclude that: Theorem 8. For every fixed k, PTW k can be solved in polynomial under the plurality and veto rules.
The polynomial degree in Theorem 8 depends on k. This is unavoidable, at least for the plurality rule, under conventional assumptions in parameterized complexity. This is shown by the proof of Theorem 2 that gives an FPT reduction from the dominating-set problem, which is W[2]-hard, to PTW. Theorem 9. Under the plurality rule, PTW is W[2]-hard for the parameter k.
Beyond Plurality and Veto
The Classification Theorem (Theorem 1) states that PW is intractable for every pure scoring rule other than plurality or veto. While this hardness easily generalizes to PTW k for k = 1, it is not at all clear how to generalize it to any k > 1. In particular, we cannot see how to reduce PW to PTW k while assuming only the purity of the rule. We can, however, show such a reduction under a stronger notion of purity.
A rule r is strongly pure if the score sequence for m + 1 candidates is obtained from the score sequence for m candidates by inserting a new score, either to beginning or the end of the sequence. More formally, r = { s m } m∈N + is strongly pure if for all m ≥ 1, either s m+1 = s m+1 (1) • s m or s m+1 = s m • s m+1 (m + 1). Note that t-approval, t-veto and Borda are all strongly pure. Theorem 10. Suppose that the positional scoring rule is strongly pure, has polynomial scores, and is neither plurality nor veto. Then PTW k is NP-complete for all fixed k.
Proof. Let r be a positional scoring rule that satisfies the conditions of the theorem, and let us denote r by { s m } m>1 . We use a reduction from PW under r. Consider the input P and c for PW over a set C of m candidates. Let m ′ = m + k − 1.
Since r is strongly pure, there is an index t ≤ k − 1 such that Figure 1 : The voters Mi,j used in the proof of Theorem 10 with r ′ (j) as a shorthand notation for r(m ′ , j)
That is, s m ′ is obtained from s m by inserting t values at the top coordinates and k−1−t values at the bottom coordinates. We define C ′ , P ′ and ≻ ′ tie as follows. • C ′ = C ∪ D 1 ∪ D 2 where D 1 = {d 1 , . . . , d t } and D 2 = {d t+1 , . . . , d k−1 }. Denote D = D 1 ∪ D 2 . • P ′ is the concatenation Q • M of two partial profiles.
The first is Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ), where Q i is the same as P i , except that the candidates of D 1 are placed at the top positions and the candidates of D 2 are placed at the bottom positions. Formally, Q i := P i ∪P (D 1 , C, D 2 ). The second, M, consists of n · s m ′ (1) copies of the profile where the inequality is due to the assumption that s m ′ (1) > s m ′ (m ′ ). Let T ′ be a completion of P ′ , we get that s(T ′ , c ′ ) ≤ n · s m ′ (1) + s(M, c ′ ) ≤ s m ′ (1) + s(M, d) − n · s m ′ (1) ≤ s(T ′ , d) .
Since the candidates of D are the first candidates in ≻ ′ tie , they always defeat the candidates of C.
We show that c is a possible winner for P if and only if c is a possible top-k winner for (C ′ , P ′ , ≻ ′ tie ). Let T = (T 1 , . . . T n ) be a completion of P where c is a winner. Consider the completion T ′ = (T ′ 1 , . . .
. For every c ′ ∈ C, we know that s(T ′ , d) ≥ s(T ′ , c ′ ) for every d ∈ D, and from the property of s m ′ we get that s(T ′ , c ′ ) = s(T, c ′ ) + n · s m ′ (1) · m ′ i=k s m ′ (i) .
From the choice of ≻ ′ tie , c defeats all candidates of C \ {c} in T ′ , hence c ′ is a top-k winner in T ′ . Conversely, let T ′ = (T ′ 1 , . . . T ′ n ) • M be a completion of P ′ where c is a top-k winner, define a completion T of P by removing D from all orders in (T ′ 1 , . . . T ′ n ). For every c ′ ∈ C we have
hence c is a winner in T.
The proof of Theorem 10 can be easily adjusted to show the hardness of determining whether a given candidate set of the fixed size k is a top-k set.
Theorem 11. Suppose that the positional scoring rule is strongly pure, has polynomial scores, and is neither plurality nor veto. Then for every fixed k it is NP-complete to decide whether a given candidate set is a possible top-k set.
Concluding Remarks
We studied the problems of detecting the necessary and possible top-k winners over incomplete voting profiles. We showed that these problems are fundamentally harder than their classic top-1 counterparts (necessary and possible winners) when k is given as part of the input. For a fixed k, we have generally recovered the tractable positional scoring rules of the top-1 variant. Many problems are left for investigation in future research: completing our results towards full classifications (of the class of pure rules), establishing useful tractability conditions for an input k, further investigating the parameterized complexity of the problem when k is the parameter, detecting the necessary and possible committee members under different committee-selection policies, and incorporating fairness and diversity constraints.
